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The Placebo Effect Has Come of Age
In 1969, William McGuire described the three stages of what he called the life history of an 
artifact (McGuire, 1969).  The first stage is ignorance.  With respect to the placebo effect, this 
characterizes the history of medicine up to the middle of the 20th century.  Before then, place-
bos might be used to mollify persistent patients, but the idea that they might produce actual 
benefits was rarely considered.  In the 1950s and 1960s, a spate of studies reported beneficial 
effects of placebos, not only on subjective well-being, but also on concomitant physiological 
function.  This signaled the transition from the ignorance stage to what McGuire called the 
coping stage in the life history of an artifact.  The coping stage is the period in which the 
existence of an artifact is recognized and research methods are developed to control for it. 
In the last half of the 20th century, the use of placebo-controlled randomized clinical trials 
(RTCs) became the norm.
The papers in this theme issue of Mind Body Regulation indicate that the concept of pla-
cebo is maturing from the coping stage into the final stage in the life history of an artifact: the 
exploitation stage.  It is here that interest in a concept evolves from the view of it as an artifact 
that needs to be controlled to a phenomenon that is interesting in its own right. The focus 
shifts toward understanding the placebo effect.  The questions being asked include:  What 
are the psychological and physiological mechanisms by which placebo effects are produced? 
What are the conditions that placebo effects can or cannot be affected by placebo?  What fac-
tors maximize or minimize the placebo effect?  How reliable is it?  Can placebo responders be 
identified and, if so, who are they?  And finally, the sixty four thousand dollar question: how 
can placebo effects be harnessed ethically in clinical practice?
This latter question is particularly important in light of the following observations.  There 
are conditions (e.g., depression) for which placebos can be as effective—or almost as effec-
tive—as approved medications (Kirsch, 2009; Kirsch et al., 2008).  Placebos differ from these 
medications, however, in at least one important way: they are virtually free of dangerous side 
effects.  I say virtually free because placebos can cause side effects.  This is one type of the 
negative effects of placebos that has given rise to the concept of the nocebo effect, which is 
an undesirable effect produced by placebos or placebo-like stimuli (e.g., verbal information 
and conditioning).  The best example of placebo-induced side effects is a study reported in 
The Lancet in 1981, in which telling people that headaches are a side effect of lumbar puncture 
resulted in significantly more self-reported headaches following the procedure (Daniels & 
Sallie, 1981).  Still, the incidence of adverse events following placebo treatment is substantially 
less than their incidence following administration of active drugs (e.g., Philipp, Kohnen, & 
Hiller, 1999).
The ethics of placebo in clinical practice
The biggest barrier to the use of placebos in clinical practice is the almost universal percep-
tion that for a placebo to be effective it must be administered deceptively.  Since expectancies 
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appear to play a major role in placebo responding, informing people accurately that they are 
being given a placebo should prevent it from being effective. There is a way around this, how-
ever.  If a convincing rationale can be presented, perhaps placebos can be prescribed openly 
without deception.  Recently, my colleagues and I developed and tested such a rationale 
(Kaptchuk et al., 2010).  We told patients suffering from irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) that 
placebos have been shown to be effective for their condition, that their effects are induced at 
least in part by a well-known mechanism (that of classical conditioning), and that for that 
reason, the act of taking a placebo pill could work as a new mind–body treatment that could 
reduce IBS symptoms.  We found that the patients in our study accepted this rationale, took 
their placebo pills as prescribed (two pills twice a day), and got better in comparison to pa-
tients in a control group that were not given the placebo pills.  
In the current issue, Foddy (2011) challenges “the view that the deceptive nature of pla-
cebo treatments creates an insurmountable ethical barrier to their use.”  He acknowledges 
that our study (Kaptchuk, et al., 2010) has shown that open label administration of placebo 
can produce clinically meaningful benefits, but questions whether those benefits could be 
a strong as those of a deceptive placebo.  We think they can in fact be that strong.  The ef-
fect we obtained was similar to that obtained by active medication in treatment of irritable 
bowel syndrome (IBS).  A meta-analysis of clinical trials of alosetron as a treatment for IBS 
showed that 51% of patients treated with the drug obtained adequate relief, compared to 38% 
of patients treated with placebo (Rahimi, Nikfar, & Abdollahi, 2008).  In our study, the non-
deceptive, open label placebo produced a response rate of 59%, higher than that of alosetron, 
and significantly higher than that of a conventional double-blind placebo.
Nevertheless, the argument that deceptive administration of placebo is ethical cannot 
easily be dismissed.  Although open administration may provide an alternative for some pa-
tients with some disorders, it needs to be assessed for a broader range of conditions, and there 
may be patients for whom the rationale we used would not be convincing and who would 
therefore not experience much benefit.  Nevertheless, treatment with placebo—whether de-
ceptive or non-deceptive—is not the only viable alternative.  When placebo works, it does so 
by means of its psychological characteristics, that is, because of the meaning that it has for 
the patient (Moerman, this issue: 2011). That means that other psychological treatments are 
likely to work.  These are treatments that intend to work by examining the meanings that 
events have for people, and they can thus be understood as non-deceptive placebos.  It is 
interesting to note that hypnosis is an efficacious treatments for IBS, according to a review of 
outcome studies (Tan, Hammond, & Gurralam Joseph, 2005), and the clinical use of hypno-
sis has been interpreted as a non-deceptive placebo (Kirsch, 1994).
Antidepressants and the placebo effect
Abi-Jaoude (this issue: 2011) has provided a very thoughtful and useful commentary on my 
studies of the placebo effect in antidepressant medication (Kirsch, 2010; Kirsch, et al., 2008; 
Kirsch, Moore, Scoboria, & Nicholls, 2002).  In so doing, he has raised some very important 
questions.  In particular, he notes that the apparent magnitude of the drug-placebo differ-
ence is influenced by the metric that is chosen.  My colleagues and I have reported a differ-
ence of less than two points on the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD) (Kirsch, 
et al., 2008; Kirsch, et al., 2002).  Using an overlapping data set, Swedish regulators found 
a 16% difference in response rates (Melander, Tomas Salmonson a, Abadie, & van Zwieten-
Boot, 2008), which they claimed was clinically meaningful.  How can these two sets of data 
be reconciled?
The key to this lies in understanding response rates and the illusions that they can cre-
ate (Altman & Royston, 2006; Kirsch & Moncrieff, 2007).  The criterion conventionally used 
to define a response to antidepressant treatment is a 50% reduction in treatment.  Those 
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showing this reduction are categorized as treatment responders, whereas those not showing 
it are considered non-responders.  Once the words ‘responder’ and ‘non-responder’ terms 
are applied we think that these are the percentages of people who improved substantially 
versus the percentages who did not improve at all, but this is an illusion.  Actually, differ-
ence in improvement between a responder and a non-responder can be as little as one point 
on whatever scale is used to measure depression.  The people who improve on drug but not 
placebo are most likely to be those who would have a 50% or 49% reduction of symptoms on 
the drug and a 48% or 49% reduction on placebo.
Certainly people know this, but when they interpret data, they often seem to forget it. 
Their conclusions about what is clinically significant seem to assume that non-responders 
have shown little improvement and that responders have shown much more improvement. 
They neglect to notice that the 10–15% difference between the real drug and placebo might 
very well reflect the proportion of patients whose improvement on placebo is so great that 
even a tiny boost in efficacy will push them over the threshold that distinguishes response 
from non-response.
To make matters worse, it turns out that the 50% criterion that has been consensually 
adopted as the definition of a clinical response is very close to the median and the mean of 
improvement distributions for antidepressants.  This makes it even more likely that the shift 
from response to non-response is attributable to small differences that cross the 50% thresh-
old for responding.
A second issue raised by Abi-Jaoude (2011) concerns the effects of knowing that one 
might receive a placebo.  He cites meta-analyses showing that the response to antidepres-
sants is lower when patients know that they getting an active treatment than when they know 
that they might be given placebo, and that the greater the likelihood of getting a placebo, the 
lower the therapeutic response (Papakostas & Fava; Sinyor et al., 2010; Sneed et al., 2008). 
Abi-Jaoude interprets this as indicating that placebo-controlled trial designs may underesti-
mate drug and overestimate placebo effects.  I interpret these data differently.  When people 
are given a drug, part of their response will be due to the chemical composition of the drug 
and part to the placebo effect.  In other words, the placebo effect and the drug effect are 
components of the drug response.  When one manipulates the expectancy of getting the real 
drug (e.g., there is a 0% vs. 33% vs. 50% chance of getting a placebo in this trial), one is alter-
ing the placebo component of the response to the drug.  That cannot change the drug effect, 
which is the chemical effect of the drug over and above the placebo component of the drug 
response.  So what these studies demonstrate is that 1) the size of the placebo effect can be 
altered, 2) drug and placebo effects are additive, and 3) for that reason, altering the placebo 
component of the drug response changes the overall response to the drug.  But the size of the 
drug effect remains the same.
References
Abi-Jaoude, E. (2011). Are SSRI antidepres-
sants little more than active placebo? A 
critical exploration. The Journal of Mind–
Body Regulation, 1(2), 100–105.
Altman, D. G., & Royston, P. (2006). The cost 
of dichotomising continuous variables. 
British Medical Journal, 332(7549), 1080. 
doi: 10.1136/bmj.332.7549.1080
Daniels, A. M., & Sallie, R. (1981). 
Headache, lumbar puncture, and expecta-
tion. The Lancet, 1(8227), 1003. 
Kirsch, I. (1994). Clinical hypnosis as a non-
deceptive placebo: Empirically derived 
techniques. American Journal of Clinical 
Hypnosis, 37(2), 95–106. 
Kirsch, I. (2009). The emperor’s new drugs: 
Exploding the antidepressant myth. 
London, UK: The Bodley Head.
Kirsch, I. (2010). The emperor’s new drugs: 
Exploding the antidepressant myth. New 
York, NY: Basic Books.
Kaptchuk, T. J., Friedlander, E., Kelley, J. M., 
Sanchez, M. N., Kokkotou, E., Singer, 
J. P., et al. (2010). Placebos without 
Deception: A Randomized Controlled 
Trial in Irritable Bowel Syndrome. PLoS 
One, 5(12), e15591. doi:10.1371/journal.
pone.0015591
Foddy, B. (2011). The ethical placebo. The 
Journal of Mind–Body Regulation, 1(2), 
53–62.
109 || MBR || Volume : I || Issue : 2
in pract ice… The Journal of Mind–Body Regulation
m
br
.s
yn
er
gi
es
pr
ai
ri
es
.c
a
Kirsch, I., Deacon, B. J., Huedo-Medina, T. 
B., Scoboria, A., Moore, T. J., & Johnson, 
B. T. (2008). Initial severity and anti-
depressant benefits: A meta-analysis of 
data submitted to the Food and Drug 
Administration. PLoS Medicine, 5(2), e45. 
Retrieved from http://www.plosmedicine.
org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.
pmed.0050045
Kirsch, I., & Moncrieff, J. (2007). Clinical 
trials and the response rate illusion. 
Contemporary Clinical Trials, 28(4), 
348–351. 
Kirsch, I., Moore, T. J., Scoboria, A., & 
Nicholls, S. S. (2002). The emperor’s new 
drugs: An analysis of antidepressant med-
ication data submitted to the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration. Prevention & 
Treatment, 5(1), 23. doi: 10.1037/1522-
3736.5.1.523a
McGuire, W. J. (1969). Suspiciousness of 
experimenter’s intent. In R. Rosenthal & 
R. L. Rosnow (Eds.), Artifact in behav-
ioral research (pp. 13–57). New York, NY: 
Academic Press.
Melander, H., Tomas Salmonson a, b., 
Abadie, E., & van Zwieten-Boot, B. 
(2008). A regulatory Apologia—A 
review of placebo-controlled stud-
ies in regulatory submissions of 
new-generation antidepressants. European 
Neuropsychopharmacology, 18, 623-627. 
doi:10.1016/j.euroneuro.2008.06.003
Sneed, J. R., Rutherford, B. R., Rindskopf, 
D., Lane, D. T., Sackeim, H. A., & Roose, 
S. P. (2008). Design Makes a Difference: 
A Meta-Analysis of Antidepressant 
Response Rates in Placebo-Controlled 
Versus Comparator Trials in Late-Life 
Depression. American Journal of Geriatric 
Psychiatry, 16(1), 65–73. 
Tan, G., Hammond, D. C., & Gurralam 
Joseph, G. (2005). Hypnosis and irritable 
bowel syndrome: a review of efficacy and 
mechanism of action. American Journal 
of Clinical Hypnosis, 47(3), 161–178. 
Moerman, D. E. (2011). Examining a power-
ful healing effect through a cultural lens, 
and finding meaning. The Journal of 
Mind–Body Regulation, 1(2), 63–62.
Papakostas, G. I., & Fava, M. Does the 
probability of receiving placebo in-
fluence clinical trial outcome? A 
meta-regression of double-blind, random-
ized clinical trials in MDD. European 
Neuropsychopharmacology, 19, 34–40. 
Philipp, M., Kohnen, R., & Hiller, K. O. 
(1999). Hypericum extract versus 
imipramine or placebo in patients with 
moderate depression: randomised multi-
centre study of treatment for eight weeks. 
British Medical Journal, 319, 1534–1539. 
Rahimi, R., Nikfar, S., & Abdollahi, M. 
(2008). Efficacy and tolerability of 
alosetron for the treatment of irritable 
bowel syndrome in women and men: A 
meta-analysis of eight randomized, pla-
cebo-controlled, 12-week trials. Clinical 
Therapeutics, 30, 884–901. 
Sinyor, M., Levitt, A. J., Cheung, A. H., 
Schaffer, A., Kiss, A., Dowlati, Y., et al. 
(2010). Does inclusion of a placebo arm 
influence response to active antidepres-
sant treatment in randomized controlled 
trials? Results from pooled and meta-
analyses. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 71, 
270–279. 
